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**Hugh** · 07-05-2021, 16:04

Quote:

Originally Posted by nomadking

I have plenty of evidence of the OFFICIAL kind. Certainly NOT from the opinion of a random person and most definitely not from the media.
I have previously supplied all the evidence, and of course it's ignored because it doesn't fit the bogus agenda.
Are you denying that the cladding panels aren't thin(ie a few mm)?

Are you denying the insulation at Grenfell was only rated for use above a certain height, if and only if, surrounded by non-combustible material? Are you denying that the insulation is used on smaller buildings?

Did I make up the 100mm and 150mm thickness of insulation or did I look up the planning documents?

Did I make up the restrictions on use of the insulation, or did I look up the manufacturers advice and that of the Royal Institute of British Architects(RIBA)? Take a wild guess.

---------- Post added at 15:07 ---------- Previous post was at 14:49 ----------

That WOULDN'T explain how any fire reached back into other flats bridging an air gap(between cladding and insulation), 100mm of insulation, and concrete walls.
The point being, cement boards WEREN'T used, therefore the insulation was a fire risk.
The designers would've seen the manufacturers comment of it being the only similar insulation material legally allowed in building above a certain height. It was listed as such on the Royal Institute of British Architects(RIBA) website. I checked it at the time. The designers didn't look any further into what design restrictions came with that claim from the manufacturers.

In this recent example there appears to have been NO or little spreading of the fire.

https://www.insidehousing.co.uk/insi...bishment-67309

Quote:

Insulation used around windows was also combustible, despite designs requiring it to be made of mineral wool.

Including barriers that prevent fire spreading in the gaps between insulation and cladding panels is a requirement of building regulations. However, it was not done well at Grenfell.

In particular, barriers above windows were not part of the designs as required, and this mistake was not picked up by anyone who checked the designs.

https://www.insidehousing.co.uk/news...re-began-56882

Quote:

According to the report submitted to the inquiry by Professor Luke Bisby, an expert witness, gaps in these windows allowed the fire to spread from the kitchen where it started onto the cladding and then up the side of the building.

… Mr Kebede also discussed the new heating system that was installed in the tower as part of the same refurbishment.

The pipes, another expert witness Dr Barbara Lane revealed this week, had incomplete fire safety protection at the time of the fire.

In addition, as Inside Housing revealed on the day of the fire, the installation of these pipes involved the temporary removal of safeguards in the floors intended to prevent the spread of fire from floor to floor.

From the inquiry report.

https://assets.grenfelltowerinquiry....volume%201.pdf

Quote:

The progress of the fire after it had entered the cladding is considered in Chapter 23. Once the fire had escaped from Flat 16, it spread rapidly up the east face of the tower. It then spread around the top of the building in both directions and down the sides until the advancing flame fronts converged on the west face near the south-west corner, enveloping the entire building in under three hours. I find that:

a. The principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up, down and around the building was the presence of the aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores, which acted as a source of fuel. The principal mechanism for the spread of the fire horizontally and downwards was the melting and dripping of burning polyethylene from the crown and from the spandrel and column panels, which ignited fires lower down the building. Those fires then travelled back up the building, thereby allowing the flame front to progress diagonally across each face of the tower.

b. The presence of polyisocyanurate (PIR) and phenolic foam insulation boards behind the ACM panels, and perhaps components of the window surrounds, contributed to the rate and extent of vertical flame spread.

c. The crown was primarily responsible for the spread of the fire horizontally, and the columns were a principal route of downwards fire spread.

The loss of compartmentation and the spread of fire through the tower
2 .14 In Chapter 24 I consider the evidence relating to the penetration of the building by fire and smoke and the rapid loss of compartmentation. The fire on the outside of the building quickly entered many flats and smoke spread rapidly through the interior of the building. As a result, effective compartmentation was lost at an early stage. Compartmentation failed because:

a. The intensity of the heat was such that the glass in the windows inevitably failed, allowing the fire to penetrate flats.

b. Extractor fan units in the kitchens had a propensity to deform and become dislodged, providing a point of entry.

c. A number of key fire protection measures inside the tower failed. Although some fire doors held back the smoke, others did not. Some were left open and failed to close because they lacked effective self-closing devices; others were broken down by firefighters or wedged open with firefighting equipment.